Purists might say, and they would be legally correct in so doing, that the magnitude of piracy per se in the world today is relatively insignificant. Under the United Nations (UN) Convention on Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS II), piratical acts are committed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state, though most of the present day acts take place within the territorial waters of a sovereign state. While this may be legally correct, such a distinction is irrelevant in the eyes of the victim. It is for this reason -and for statistical purposes -that the International Chamber of Commerce's (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has adopted the following definition:
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship anywhere with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.
In its Annual Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for 2003, the IMB reported a total of 445 attacks on ships either at sea, at anchor or in port. The use of violence in pirate attacks continues with 21 seafarers killed, 71 missing, 359 taken hostage in that year, with 20 ships fired upon. Ships were boarded in 332 instances and a total of 19 ships were hijacked. 1 The purpose of this chapter is to analyse developments up to the time of writing and to identify possibilities for future action towards minimizing the impact of piracy. For a start, the last decade has seen four specific "types" of piracy. More often than not, they vary according to the region. However, there are also regions that share similar characteristics in certain kinds of attacks.
Regional Variations in Maritime Piracy

Ship Boarding and Theft Involving the Minimum Use of Force
The first form of piracy involves the minimum use of force in ship boarding and the theft of cash and valuables from the ship's safe and the crew. The notable feature of this type of attack is the degree of skill that is used to board the ship, coupled with the fact that violence is not normally used unless resistance is offered. The intruders usually come alongside a ship underway, often during the night, and take possession of whatever cash and negotiable valuables come easily to hand after boarding it. These attacks are also not on the high seas as all the waters in the area are within the territory of the various countries, which border them. It is these behavioural and geographical profiles that characterize the bulk of "Asian" piracy. A well-known target area used to be the Philip Channel between Indonesia and Singapore but the emphasis has now shifted to the Malacca Straits and the Indonesian waters in the last few years. It is also this comparative "non-violent" approach, except in Indonesian waters, that oddly enough makes the problem more difficult to combat.
Ship Boarding and Theft Predisposed Towards the Use of Force
The second type of piracy involves the boarding of a ship and the theft of its cargo and crew's personal valuables that is more disposed towards violence than Asian piracy. This kind of piracy is the main feature of "South American" and "West African" piracy and the characteristics of both of these kinds of attacks include:
• The high degree of violence by heavily armed criminals after boarding a ship; • The target items include money, negotiable goods and items of cargo and ship's equipment; • The total value of goods stolen per attack tends to be higher than in the Asian piratical attack and there is a degree of pre-planning; • There is a demonstrated lack of competence or willingness to respond on the part of law enforcement; and • Some of the target ships are at anchor.
The only similarity between Asian piracy and the South American and West African variants is that these pirates come alongside in small craft and mount high-sided ships with remarkable agility. From that point onwards no other similarity exists, as the South American and West African attackers often offer gratuitous violence and will steal anything that is unsecured. If the ships' equipment is stolen, the safety of the ship -in terms of its ability to steer and navigate safely and effectively -can be placed at great risk.
Political Piracy
Third, some types of maritime attacks appear to exhibit a certain military or political feature. Notable among these was the attack by terrorists on the cruise ship Achille Lauro on 7 October 1985, in the eastern Mediterranean. This attack was instrumental in the creation of the 1988 SUA Convention by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The year 1993, in particular, saw a new trend with regard to piracy off the waters of China where crafts manned by persons dressed in military uniforms intercepted and fired on passing ships. However, these attacks have diminished over the years possibly due to the publicity given to them in the international press.
Hijacking in Piracy: The Case of the Alondra Rainbow
Finally, against the grain of non-violent attacks that tend to characterize Asian piracy, a violent form of piracy tends to exist in Southeast Asia involving the hijacking of ships underway, overpowering the crew in question and stealing the vessel's entire cargo. In some cases, the pirates actually return the ship in the hands of the crew. In more extreme cases, the crew are either thrown overboard or even killed. As two prominent examples in the shipping community, the unfortunate MV Cheung Son with 23 Chinese crew was hijacked by pirates in late 1998 and the crew were murdered in cold blood. MV Tenyu was hijacked in September 1998 and her 15 crew consisting of two Koreans and 13 Chinese are still missing. In recent years, the waters off the province of Aceh in Northern Sumatra have also become a high-risk area for hijacking of ships and crew.
However, the Alondra Rainbow incident remains as the classic example of a piracy attack involving hijacking in Southeast Asia and it illustrates how the industry and the authorities can work together to defeat the pirates. On 22 October 1999, the Alondra Rainbow loaded a cargo of 7,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots and sailed from Kuala Tanjung in Indonesia for Miike in Japan. Shortly after her departure, a gang of pirates armed with swords and guns hijacked the ship. The 17 crew members were threatened with death and transferred to the MV Sanho, which came alongside at sea. They were held captive for a week and eventually set adrift in a life raft on 29 October 1999. They were rescued by a Thai fishing boat ten days later on 8 November 1999, off the North East coast of Sumatra. On 28 October 1999, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre commenced broadcasting a message to ships at sea via the safetyNET service of Inmarsat-C satellite with a request to report any ship, which matched the description of the Alondra Rainbow. The excellent response from various masters at sea helped locate the missing ship. On 14 November 1999, the master of a Kuwaiti tanker reported sighting a ship matching the profile of the Alondra Rainbow heading into the Arabian Sea. The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre passed this information along with a photograph of the Alondra Rainbow to the Indian Coast Guard and requested their assistance.
The response of the Indian authorities was swift. The Coast Guard immediately despatched a patrol aircraft to search the area. Upon sighting the suspect ship, the Coast Guard advised that her profile matched the photograph of the Alondra Rainbow. However, the suspect ship had a name Mega Rama and was flying the Belize flag. Quick checks by the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre revealed that no such ship was registered in Belize. The patrol aircraft then attempted radio contact with the ship but she maintained radio silence. Thereafter a coast guard patrol vessel was sent to intercept the ship, 70 miles West of Ponnani. Despite warning shots fired across her bow, the ship increased speed and continued her path. It was only when a missile-carrying corvette, the INS Prahar, was called into action that the high seas chase was brought to an end. The naval ship deployed a graduated use of force to bring about the suspect ship's capture on the 16 November 1999; approximately 300 miles south west of Mumbai. The fifteen Indonesians found on board allegedly attempted to destroy the evidence by setting fire to and scuttling the ship. The naval boarding party put out the fire, brought the flooding under control and towed the ship to Mumbai. Investigations showed that Mr Burham Nanda, chief engineer along with Mr Christinous Mintando, the ship master, met an employment agent at a coffee shop in Batam, Indonesia on 4 October 1999. They finalized the plans to hijack Alondra Rainbow and boarded MV Sanho which was anchored in Jakarta. The Sanho sailed with about thirty-five persons on board. A dozen of its crew were armed with weapons, with the ringleader colloquially referred to as "boss". The Sanho's first port of call was the island of Batam where she took bunkers, water and provisions. On 17 October 1999, she left for Kuala Tanjung, Indonesia arriving there on 22 October 1999. One member of the gang had already boarded the Alondra Rainbow while she was loading her cargo. In the late evening of 22 October 1999, about ten to twelve persons armed with pistols and lethal weapons were transferred from the Sanho onto a speedboat. When the Alondra Rainbow was sighted, the speedboat reached behind her stern. The member of the gang who had hidden on board the Alondra Rainbow, lowered ropes for his accomplices to climb on board. The crew of the Alondra Rainbow were captured and their hands were tied. At this stage, the Sanho came alongside and Mintando and fourteen other individuals posing as conventional crew climbed aboard and took charge of the Alondra Rainbow. The original crew of the Alondra Rainbow were transferred to the Sanho.
On 23 October 1999, Mintando and the fourteen crew changed the name of the Alondra Rainbow to the Global Venture and proceeded to Miri in East Malaysia, arriving there on 26 October 1999. Black paint was supplied at Miri and her hull was repainted over its original blue. On 27 October 1999, about 3,000 metric tonnes of aluminium ingots were transhipped on to another ship called Bonsoon II, which came alongside. After this, the employment agent instructed Mintando to sail toward Karachi in Pakistan. At some stage the name of the Alondra Rainbow, alias Global Venture was changed again to Mega Rama. In the meantime, the Bonsoon II proceeded to the Philippines and discharged the stolen 3,000 metric tonnes of cargo there. The Mega Rama was finally captured after nearly three weeks and taken to Mumbai as described earlier. At least two of the fifteen Indonesians on board had featured in the hijacking of the Tenyu in September 1998, which suggests that they are part of an organized syndicate.
While India is a signatory to UNCLOS II, this convention had not been incorporated in to the national legislation. The Indian Penal Code does not address the offence of piracy or hijacking of ships. Further, at the time of arresting the alleged pirates, India was not a signatory to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). However, Indian law enforcement could have prosecuted the pirates under Piracy Jure Gentium, an offence against all nations. The offender is said to be punishable by his captors (in this case the Republic of India), wherever he may be found, to whatever nationality he may belong, and in whatever court having jurisdiction. Similarly, the pirates could be tried under the British Admiralty Laws, as theses existed at the time of independence in 1947. In the end, the Mumbai police successfully established jurisdiction and charged the alleged pirates with eleven counts under provisions of the Indian penal code. Initially, the alleged pirates of the MV Alondra Rainbow were produced before the metropolitan magistrate in Mumbai after their capture and later brought before the highest sessions court. The hearing commenced on 14 March 2001. In March 2003, the accused were sentenced to seven years of hard labour.
highest number of attacks in 2003 since the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre commenced compiling statistics in 1991. The 2003 figures also show an increase in the number and violence of the attacks. However, they also show that some kinds of attacks and attacks in certain areas have dramatically reduced. This proves once again that when law enforcement agencies take these attacks seriously, there will be a corresponding reduction in the attacks.
Violence Continues to Rise
The report for 2003 also shows that the violence used in the attacks continued to rise, with 21 seafarers killed, 40 assaulted and 88 injured; an increase over the 10 killed, 9 assaulted and 38 injured in the previous year. There were 71 crew or passengers missing in 2003 and this should be considered along with the 21 confirmed killed. The number of attacks using guns rose to 100 from 68 and the number of hostages taken nearly doubled to 359 seafarers. Ships were boarded in 311 instances and a total of 19 ships were hijacked. 
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nigeria Top the Rankings
Some Positive Regional Developments
However, there are some positive developments to speak of in Southeast Asia, the African continent and South America. The number of attacks in Thailand, the Singapore Straits, Malaysia, the
Incidents of Hijackings are Going Down
The number of ships hijacked for the theft of the ship and cargo dramatically reduced in 2003. The type of hijackings now taking place involve more vulnerable targets such as tugs and barges. Ships are also hijacked in order to abduct the crew for ransom. These kidnappings are believed to be largely the work of militia groups in politically vulnerable areas. In 23 per cent of the attacks, tankers were the targets. It remains a matter of concern that these ships tend to carry dangerous cargo and could be temporarily under the control of unauthorized individuals such as pirates.
Assessing the Potential Environmental Impact of Piracy Attacks: Danger in the Philip Channel
For a variety of reasons, short-term seizures have caught the imagination of the maritime industry, the press and the public. Much is made of the unacceptability of the situation but it is necessary to view the problem in perspective. While theft by violence is inexcusable, the frequency of these attacks and the sums stolen compared with the frequency and size of similar shore-based crimes is relatively small against the grain of the total volume of shipping and other vessels plying out waters worldwide. Therefore, in spite of pressures put upon law enforcement, these attacks will not necessarily loom large in their order of priorities.
What is continuously present but often accorded little attention or interest -if even acknowledged -is the potential for an environmentally related disaster to occur. In the early 1990s, most of the attacks in Southeast Asia took place in a 32-kilometre long stretch of the Philip Channel, the southern half of the waterway between Singapore Island and Indonesia. In this area, which is the West-East seaway, ships of all types were attacked including conventional cargo ships, container ships and tankers. Tankers proceeding eastbound are generally laden and come from Persian Gulf ports. The statistics relating to ships using this area show that the greatest possible time interval between ships proceeding in any one direction is about twenty minutes and the lateral clearance between two ships going in opposite directions is sometimes no more than a mile (1.6 kilometres). The hazards of the area are such that the master of a large tanker will point out the fact that the maintenance of lookouts and other navigational responsibilities while transiting the narrow and crowded waterway means that no extra personnel are easily available for an anti-piracy watch.
The potential consequences of a tanker having her bridge unmanned and, therefore, and without control during a pirate attack are quite clear. In one recorded incident, due to the fact that when the attackers left a ship, the crew could not immediately free themselves, the bridge was unmanned for a period of seventy minutes. Had this incident taken place in the Philip Channel, a disaster would have been almost inevitable. In the first nine months of 1999, there were thirteen reported piracy attacks in the Indonesian part of Singapore Straits. On 16 January 1999, MT Chaumont, a fully loaded Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) was attacked by pirates while navigating in narrow waters of the Philip Channel. The pirates threatened the chief officer with a machete to his neck and tied his hands.
Learning From the Exxon Valdez Disaster
In March 1989, the world was appalled at the ecological and environmental carnage caused by the Exxon Valdez disaster. For reasons unconnected to piracy, the ship's holds were breached and some 50 million litres of oil were released. A conservative figure states that cleansing operations were necessary along 3,500 kilometres of coastline. Hence, the world has seen that a spillage of this magnitude can occur. The international community has also seen the consequences of such a catastrophe through direct experience. Disastrous though the consequences of the Exxon Valdex incident were, in one respect, Alaska was probably the best place it could have happened as the area is sparsely populated. Transpose the circumstances to a similar incident in the Philip Channel and the resultant oil pollution would be disastrous. Apart from the pollution, every possibility exists that the seaway would have to be closed to shipping and the fishing in the area would be ruined for many years.
Unfortunately, it does turn out that many people tend not to acknowledge potential problems until they actually occur. The IMB is convinced that, because there will be no second chance with an oil-spill, a proactive attitude to the possibility is essential and it would be foolhardy to the point of irresponsibility not to take all possible measures to prevent the first one.
Practical Aspects of Piracy Prevention
Much has been written concerning the preventive measures and many guidelines for mariners have been published. On the one hand some measures are to be taken by the ship owners and crew themselves, and some other measures are to be taken by governments. These measures are more complex, especially when national borders are crossed in the interdiction of pirates.
Obviously, the most effective way to tackle the problem squarely is to prevent the pirates boarding the ship in the first instance. The knowledge and experience of so many ship masters, their officers and crew is of great use here and the following points are a distillation of "tried and tested" techniques made available in further detail by the IMO:
• Keeping a lookout and radio watch • Exhibiting a readiness to respond • Not resisting boarders • Conduct during an attack • Pre-planning and post-incident response. 
Efforts by the IMB
The maritime industry is also doing what it possibly can. For example, through the support of seventeen organizations such as protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs, ship owners and insurers, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur was set up in 1992. 4 The centre is now recognized throughout the maritime industry for its valuable contribution in quantifying the problem of world piracy and providing assistance, free of charge to ships that have been attacked. The IMB now broadcasts its Piracy Situation Reports daily to all ships in world piracy hotspots including Asia, the coasts of Africa and South America through Inmarsat-C satellite's safetyNET service. As a result, ships receive up-todate intelligence on pirate activity in these areas. The IMB also promptly passes reports of attacks to the law enforcement. Average time taken by the IMB to onward transmit the message is ten minutes. The IMB also posts the weekly updates of attacks on its Internet website. 5 The report is compiled from the Piracy Reporting Centre's daily status bulletins. Thus the ship owners and authorities ashore as well as ships at sea can access the weekly updates.
The Role of Technology
As it has been pointed by the IMB in the past, technology can play an important role in the battle against piracy. 6 For example, the IMB is quite supportive of two technological products called Secure-Ship -a preventive and deterrence system to deter boarding attempts -via a non-lethal, 9,000 volt pulse electrifying fence surrounding the ship -and ShipLocan inexpensive satellite tracking system designed to locate ships at sea or in port via tiny transmitter concealed onboard ships and monitored through any personal computer with Internet access.
7 Fitted together, ShipLoc and Secure-Ship may be a possible answer to combating piracy more effectively by most vessels (except tankers and gas carriers to which Secure-Ship cannot currently be fitted).
Maritime Terrorism
The attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001 generated a great deal of discussion at the IMO and elsewhere on the vulnerability of shipping to terrorism. Verifying the contents of containers, ensuring the security of containers in transit, the identity of crew members on board vessels, the transport of biological and chemical weapons, attacks against vessels and their use as weapons became the subject of intense debate and resulted in the creation of International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code.
Many stakeholders in the shipping community had hoped that while it was necessary to prepare for all eventualities, the industry would probably escape the attention of the terrorists. After all, attacking a merchant vessel carrying cargo is unlikely to fuel the publicity sought by terrorists. However, on Sunday, 13 October 2002, the Limburg, a 299,000-tonne tanker, suffered an explosion as it was approaching the pilot station at Mina Al-Dabah in Yemen. One crew member died and 90,000 barrels of crude spilled into the sea. Investigations confirmed that a boat filled with explosives had rammed the vessel.
The kind of attack launched on the Limburg is difficult to prevent. No shipboard action can protect the ship in these circumstances. These are slow vessels and their manoeuvrability restricted. It is therefore impossible for the vessel to avoid a fast moving boat intent on a beam-on collision.
The answer must therefore lie with the coastal state to ensure that the approaches to their ports are made secure. Port authorities should specify approach channels for tankers and other vulnerable vessels. These channels and the areas on each side of them should be monitored by coast guard or police vessels to ensure that no small craft, leisure, fishing or unauthorized vessel enters this restricted zone. If they do, the vessel must be immediately approached and investigated. The idea is to have a "clearway" through which authorized vessels can navigate without the fear that a small vessel close to the fairway will suddenly project itself towards it at high speed.
In the final analysis, the risk of terrorist attack can perhaps never be eliminated, but sensible steps can be taken to reduce the risk. The issue is how seriously do the governments take the threat of maritime terrorism. Post-Limburg, we cannot continue to hope for the best, and ignore vital past lessons.
Conclusion: A Way Forward
The following incident is typical of some of the recent violent attacks: On 5 January 2004, while underway, an Indonesian product tanker MT Cherry 201 was attacked and hijacked by armed pirates in the Malacca Strait. The pirates armed with guns boarded the ship and took thirteen crew members hostage. They later released the master so that he could convey their demand for ransom. After one month of negotiations with the pirates, the pirates shot dead four crew members. The remaining eight crew members jumped overboard and escaped.
In view of the increasing ferocity and numbers of piratical attacks such as this cited case, one could be excused for asking "why?" and "what will happen now?" The answer to the first question is simple: The pirates have all the advantages. They have the knowledge of what is being carried by specific ships and, perhaps the most relevant point, they have all the sea room in which to operate. This and the fact that modern radar will enable them to watch to see if they themselves are being followed means that they can wait and commit their crime with impunity knowing that they will have time to escape at the first suggestion that any intervention force is on its way.
The difficulties are enormous. Not only is there an enormous maritime space to be covered but there also currently exists an impediment towards effective action by way of the strained financial circumstances of certain governments involved in the fight against piracy. To create a response capability able to catch and match the pirates would require the expenditure of considerable resources and some countries just do not have the necessary financial budget. When one adds to these difficulties the political problems which arise when pirates are acting in waters which are the territory of two neighbouring states and move quickly from one jurisdiction to another, it is little wonder that so much remains to be done.
The answer to the second question is not so simple. In the wake of the Achille Lauro incident in the autumn of 1985, the IMO responded with the creation of recommendations for "the implementation of measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships". The IMO both retained the initiative and maintained the impetus for this by conducting several regional missions and seminars on piracy and ship security matters as well as discussing the issue in its Maritime Safety Committee. The recently introduced ISPS Code will hopefully result in enhanced maritime security and reducing the number of incidents of maritime violence.
The IMO's SUA Convention is meant to ensure that states take appropriate action against any person committing offences such as seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. While this convention was primarily designed for terrorism, it can be applied to most incidents involving piracy and armed robbery against ships. 8 While any initiative is highly welcomed, in reality, it is doubtful if the hardened criminals described above will be affected by such measures. Because the main problem is to be able to catch the pirates, and not so much as what to do with them once caught. It has already been shown that some coastal states lack the resources to react at sea and this is understood and has to be accepted but what is lacking is coordinated response onshore. It has to be accepted that pirates operate at sea only for the purposes of committing their crime. Finally they must come ashore, somewhere to dispose of their gains and this is where they would be vulnerable and law enforcement would be more efficient. This can only come to pass if there is collective action by national law enforcement. Until recently piracy was not a major issue for the law enforcement of individual countries as it did not affect their own population but literally was a problem of "those that pass in the night". It is a welcome relief to note that most countries are now demonstrating a proactive approach in tackling piracy. It is hoped that this state of affairs continues and countries cooperate to rid their seas of this menace.
Developed by Secure Marine in the Netherlands, an intruder coming in contact with the fence will receive an unpleasant non-lethal shock that will result in the intruder abandoning the attempted boarding. If the fence is tampered with, an alarm will go off, activating floodlights and a very loud siren. The fence is collapsible, enabling quick folding against the railing when required. Special, quick release gates are used in case a pilot wants to board, lowering a gangway or launching a life raft. The fence can be dismantled or re-installed by the crew as required. When a ship approaches a piracy prone area the crew can re-install the fence, which takes a few hours. When the ship leaves this area, the master can decide to leave the fence collapsed against the railing or dismantle it if bad weather is due. A smart remote control system enables complete control cover the systems functions without requiring wires to be pulled through the ship. The fence has also been tested in various sea conditions including Force 7 seas, with salt-water waves splashing over it. Further information is available at <http://www.secure-ship.com>. In the case of ShipLoc, the IMB has been working together with CLS, a world leading satellite tracking system operator on this device which has already been installed on a number of ships. For their own safety, the crew of the ship need not be informed of the existence or location of the transmitter. In addition to tracking ships that have come under a piracy attack and/or a hijacking, ShipLoc can also be used as a management tool to monitor progress of a voyage around the world. ShipLoc monthly rental is well affordable and gives the owners up to fifteen positions for the ship a day. The IMB piracy Reporting Centre will also monitor a ShipLoc-fitted ship that is hijacked, and liaise with law enforcement agencies until the ship is recovered. In addition to an anti-hijacking role, ShipLoc facilitates independent and precise location of ships at regular intervals. Further details can be obtained at <http://www.shiploc.com>. 8 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1988.
